I, the undersigned
Swear to the following under oath:
1 . I am an adult male with Identity number, 61 1220 5009 084, a former member of the South African
Police Services (SAPS), and presently reside in Pretoria. The contents of this declaration falls within
my personal knowledge and experience (except where explicitly mention otherwise and/or where the
necessary implication in context would appear otherwise) and it is true and correct.
My involvement with the police
2. I am part of a family which has had strong ties with the police in South Africa.
3. My father, John Wahl Loots, was a policeman throughout his career and carried the rank of Full
Colonel in the South African police when he passed away in 1987.
4. My elder sister, Esmeralda, also became a police officer of the South African Police Services after
she completed her schooling, where she remained until she retired with a medical pension as a Full
Colonel after 2000. She had been married to a policeman who had also achieved the rank of Full
Colonel within the South African Police before he retired in the 1990's on a pension.
5. My younger sister is still a Luitenant-Colonel in the Crime-Intelligence Unit of the South African
Police Services, and her ex-husband is also an officer in the same Unit. They got divorced in
6. My younger brother is presently a Captain in the Department of Correctional Services in Pretoria.
His wife is a Major in the South African Airforce.
7. On 1 1 December 1993 I married my wife (who is also a police officer). In 1996, she was transferred
to the Head Office of the South African Police Services at the Wachthuis in Pretorius Street, Pretoria.
Later, she was transferred to the Crime-Intelligence Unit of the South African Police Services, and
presently carries the rank of Full Colonel.
8. From my parents I learnt a strong sense of fairness, discipline and sociably acceptable morals.
I was taught that people, who did not have respect for such things, were rogues who promote chaos
and anarchy in societies.
9. I was in the service of the South African Police since 1979, where I served at Gezina SAPS, Radio-
Control, Pretoria. Thereafter, I was with the Unrest Unit until 1987, from where I was transferred to the
Kwa Ndebele Safety Unit.
10. Since 1990, I was connected to the Safety Unit, North Transvaal of Pretoria; where I was primarily
responsible with the monitoring of actions and activities in Mamelodi and Kwa Ndebele, in areas of
the so-called "left sphere".
1 1 . Since 1994, I was transferred to, and connected to, the "Regse-reaksionere Lessenaar" (the Desk
of the Right-wing Reactionaries) of the then Crime Information structure, where my focus was
primarily on the monitoring and activities of so-called "right-wing" reactionary individuals, groups and
movements; as well as with the infiltration and investigation of them. At around the end of 1996, I was
promoted to the rank of captain.
12. In 1996, I was working in the overt sections of the SAPS Crime-Intelligence Unit (hereinafter
referred to as "Mdi"; which I am using as an Afrikaans abbreviation for convenience, while it is known
as CI, or "Crime Intelligence", in English). In 1997, I was transferred to the covert sections of Mdi. I
worked there until I retired from the South African Police Services on 1 5 Oktober 2001 with medical
pension. My oderlies at the overt sections of Mdi was Brigadier Loots, thereafter Colonel Roelf Venter
and thereafter Kolonel Manie Van Staden. At the covert sections my orderly was Superintendent
(Luitenant-Colonel) Riaan Van Schalkwyk.
My recruitment of informants and of JC Smit, one of the state witnesses in the "Boeremag Trial"
13. During mid 1994, I identified various informants with the purpose to recruit them. I had to recruit
them, as there were just about no existing informants of which I carried knowledge. It was a new area
for me, and I tried to start off again from scratch to make a success of my project, goal and function.
1 4. In the process, I targeted a Johan Smit, alias JC Smit, and recruited him eventually by convincing
him to co-operate as an informant. At that stage he was employed at Iscor, Vanderbijlpark. If he was
an informant at that stage in any other manner, as for example the Military Intelligence, I have carried
no knowledge about it, up to today.
1 5. I certainly knew about the claimed involvement of JC Smit with the stalwarts (Ystergarde) of the
AWB, the car bombs of 1994 in Johannesburg and the Jan Smuts airport. He was divorced, and an
ideal candidate to recruit as an informant.
16. The following is my knowledge and background on the activities of JC Smit as informant and
eventually as provocateur of the SAPS amongst individuals and groups of the right-wing sphere while
I and my successor handled him:
The operations of JC Smit and the beginning of the "Boeremag"-saga
1 7. During 1 996, JC Smit was very involved with a Kobus Von Marie, who then lived in Doornpoort,
Pretoria. Von Marie introduced JC Smit to people such as the informant Jannie Smuts from the East
Rand, who worked with Johan Niemoller.
About JC Smit, Jannie Smuts, Niemoller and Adriaan ("At") Van Wyk the following:
(a) I was informed by my Mdi associate members that Jannie Smuts had already been working for
years with Niemoller, and at times also with the aforementioned in the exterior (for example, Angola)
where illegal activities with the sales of medicine, diamonds and military equipment was committed. In
the same manner, I was informed that Jannie Smuts was an informer for Mdi. I was informed later on
by Director Roos that Niemoller worked for the Military Intelligence.
(b) Here in South Africa, especially at the beginning of the so-called Boeremag-enquiry, Jannie Smuts
was actively involved with the planning and meetings of Niemoller, as well as a Jan Viljoen, according
to my information. My information was that, when the incitement of right-wingers to carry out illegal
actions - as I set out further on in this - had progressed significantly, Jannie Smuts and his handlers
agreed that he, and Niemoller, would be disassociated with the Boeremag investigation.
(c) After I left the SAPS, Colonel Louis Pretorius was placed as handler of JC Smit. Pretorius wanted
to recruit Adriaan (At) Van Wyk, one of those later accused in the Boeremag saga, as an informant,
but according to what Pretorius told me personally, At did not accept this offer. Pretorius then,
according to what he informed me, gave instruction that proof of criminal activities or actions, which
could cause At Van Wyk embarrassment should be found, so that he could be connected to the
Boeremag investigation in one way or another. They could not find anything concrete, and then,
according to what JC Smit then told me, lied in reports about At Van Wyk to incriminate him falsely
18. In the beginning of 1997, JC Smit told me that the above mentioned Von Marie spoke about
meetings, in which the mentioned Johan Niemoller was the speaker. The purpose of the meetings
were supposedly to get a plan of defense in place, in case things in South Africa went the wrong way,
so that there would be a plan in place whereby the commandos could take action in such a scenario
to restore law and order in South Africa. Later, JC Smit told me that an influential "uncle" Jan Viljoen
was involved with Niemoller in such meetings.
1 9. JC Smit was then instructed by me, and planning was done, to get into contact with Jan Viljoen,
which happened thereafter. I addressed the initial reports on the mentioned meetings at the beginning
of 1994 to our head office in Pretoria.
20. This was the beginning of the Boeremag-saga.
The involvement of the Crime-Intelligence Unit ("Mdi") of the SAPS and how the Mdi developed and
managed the Boeremag
21. After the reports mentioned above in paragraph 19, I was summoned by the senior police
members from the head office of our Intelligence structure which monitored activities of right-wingers.
Everyone wanted to know how, where and in which manner I had got my information, and how I could
22. Various sessions followed this where planning was done on how existing informants could and
should infiltrate the new "right-wing activities". My information of above mentioned activities is
confirmed, mostly by the information given by the handlers of Jannie Smuts, namely Riaan Van
Schalkwyk, and a policeman by the nickname of "Strys". During that time period, Jannie Smuts
suddenly started planning and arranging meetings, along with Jan Viljoen, for Niemoller.
23. At that stage, Director Roos from Mdi, took over and started to control the project (to infiltrate and
report on the people and their associates who were attending and organizing the meetings). He
wanted to know how and where the actions that was discussed, originated, because to him, Niemoller
was not known as someone who planned and held meetings. According to Roos, Niemoller had no
history of political activities, and had a background of Military intelligence and Special Forces. Roos
indicated that he suspected that Niemoller was planning something illegal.
24. Director (presently General) Mark Hankel then started attending our project meetings.
25. Along with Superintendent Alfons Theron, I started doing enquiries, and everything indicated more
and more that the activities of Niemoller and his group were being orchestrated by a group with the
psydonym Verligte Aksie Groep ("VAG").
26. "VAG" was old Defence Force and Police Generals and some previous Cabinet Ministers who
drew up the above action plans. When I documented this in reports, I was called in by Roos, who
gave me instructions to halt the investigation of "VAG" immediately, and to only focus my attention on
the actions of my informant, and to lead him.
27. Since 1999, the information became all the more intense. The head Office (Mdi, SAPS) started
arranging workshops on this information, whereupon all the members who were working on right-
wingers throughout the country came together to discuss the new right-wing action, and to plan how it
should be directed and managed. I must mention that all large right-wing activities, be they Safety
(SAPS), National intelligence Agency ("NIA"), Military Intelligence, and presently now also the South
African Secret Services are infiltrated, and are often taken over, managed and directed covertly.
28. During 2000, the planning of Mdi began consisting of the management of the right-wing actions of
Niemoller, in such a way that Mdi would be totally in control thereof.
Informants were instructed to be specifically involved with specific people and actions. They had to
discuss and adjust "Document 12", to which I am going to refer to below, at meetings, of which some
were specifically planned and initialised by Mdi, so that the so-called right-wingers would take the
decisions which suited Mdi.
They had to create the right culture and atmosphere, so that other right-wing thinking people would
also get involved. Hereby Mdi wanted to, and did, create the atmosphere in which it would appear that
there could be a threat in the country by a group of right-wingers, although, in reality, the threat had
been developed and controlled by the Mdi by way of their covert actions.
In this manner the Mdi-handlers carried out the orders of their SAPS orderlies via the informants,
whom had now become initiative provocateurs through the SAPS (instead of merely informants), and
took over the control and management of right-wing activities and advanced them, without the
involvement of any ordinary people, or them even knowing or realising this. They were literally led by
their noses by the SAPS provocateurs, and when they did not agree with such leadership, it was
forced upon them. In the process, many right-wingers turned their backs on this, but the provocation
was always planned in minute detail, to ensure the remaining right-wingers remain involved.
29. The Mdi-orchestrated meetings were organised more and more regularly to influence the right-
wing thinkers. I, myself, found these developments more and more unjustifiable.
30. In my reports to the Mdi-head office, I repeatedly wrote that the intentions of the right-wingers
were not to take over the country, but from the outset was merely to create a defence mechanism
which could come into order in case things in South Africa went terribly wrong. I mentioned repeatedly
that it was a spin-off of the planning initialised by VAG.
31 . My pleadings fell on deaf ears, and in the process some of my colleagues became estranged from
me. Finally, I was warned by Director Roos not to involve VAG again, and to abide by my instructions.
In the process, I became highly stressed, as I observed in which direction things were starting to
develop. The provocateurs' role, in which the SAPS played, upset me terribly.
Innocent people were caught up, used and compromised in ways that upset me intensely. I had
nowhere to complain to, as the top structure of the Mdi were driving and controlling these cases.
32. I could no longer rape my soul. In my words and pleas I clashed with seniors and they became
estranged, I was not promoted any further, and I became so highly stressed that I was put on early
retirement with a pension for the medically unfit.
33. Although the final date of my employ was 1 5 Oktober 2001 , through the course of certain
responsibilities; my domestic circumstances (by my marriage to Col. Miranda Loots, righthand of Gen.
Hankel); actions by Col. Louis Pretorius and Hankel; as well as influence from JC Smit and my wife, I
remained informed on the Mdi movements around the Boeremag investigation and case up to 201 0,
as shown further on.
34. At my retirement in 2001 , General Hankel (who was then still a Director) became fully involved
with the Boeremag project, which became known as "project WACKO" shortly after my retirement. He
took over the planning thereof to control and drive the right-wing action, especially concerning the
instructions to - and implementation thereof - the informants, who by then played a colossal role as
provocateurs. He boasted to me and my colleagues that this had become his "biggest baby".
35. Mdi (under Hankel and his co-management) indicated to the politici that the (manipulated) right-
wing activities to be the reason why the commando system should be disassembled, under the
pretext that the commando quarters were mostly used (according to the Mdi) for meetings of the right-
wingers. No finger of provocation could then be pointed at the SAPS after the commando system was
disassembled. In ths process, however, an important crime preventative structure was destroyed.
" Document 12"
36. A document was shown to me (at around 1 998) and my collegues from Mdi, who were operational
on right-wingers, during a meeting with Mdi. The person, who brought the document, was
Superintendent Riaan Van Schalkwyk, our Office Chief (Intelligence, Gauteng). The whole office was
present when the document was introduced. It was in the Johannesburg-office. Alex Rakow (presently
the handler of Jannie Smuts), Raymond Hayes and a certain "Strys" were also, amongst others,
present. There were ± 7 police members and a typist present.
37. At that stage, the document consisted of only 2 pages, and was set out in point form. The typist
retyped the document into the computer of the office as per instruction of Van Schalkwyk.
38. I saw the document; and noticed that it contained a plan, as set out in paragraph 1 8 above. We
then discussed it.
39. The first time I ever saw this document, was on this occasion.
40. The document had no heading and was only 2 pages long. Previously, informants referred to a
document which Niemoller discussed at meetings as "Document 1 2". The document which I mention
in paragraph 36, is also mentioned as "Document 12" by Van Schalkwyk. After this meeting, Head
Office ordered that we meet once a month to monitor the developments of the actions of the right-
wingers. This first meeting, was only an informative meeting. Thereafter, we had to accertain how
widely the plan was known.
41 . At following meetings, Mdi-officials from the Western Cape and Eastern Cape reported that there
was nothing happening by them. Transvaal, Free State and Natal Mdi-officials reported that such
meetings had, indeed, taken place in their areas.
42. A large Mdi meeting was held at Bloemhof Dam. This was ± at the beginning of 1998. During that
meeting, Director Roos gave instructions aside to a group Mdi-members, which included me, to adjust
"Document 12" to find publicity value therein to further our (Mdi) importance and ensure our future -
we had to adjust it to look like a document in which a coup of the government was planned.
43. Myself, Werner Smith and Riaan Van Schalkwyk had represented Gauteng at this meeting. We
decided that every handler should devise his own document, in order that informants could not be
caught out. The words of every paragraph were not to correspond, but the ideas in the document
were to be adjusted to indicate the planning of a state coup.
44. I gave JC Smit instruction to suggest at all right-wing meetings that the document should be
adjusted more and more offensively to indicate the preparation of a state coup.
45. The Mdi arranged such meetings through their informants.
46. For one of these meetings at Kathu, a celphone was installed by technici in the car of JC Smit,
and adjusted in such a manner that discussions could be listened in on, throughout. So when he then
transported right-wingers to the meeting, I and a few collegues, amongst which was Colonel Louis
Pretorius, could hear what they were discussing in the car.
47. In the same manner, as example, we regularly lured people, at whose homes meetings were held,
out from their homes, or waited until they were not in; to install secret hearing aid devices inside their
48. As I mentioned above, I and other members form Mdi altered the initial document from a
defensive to an offensive document.
49. I, myself, made changes to "Document 12" on the portable state computer of the Mdi-office, which
was then discussed thereafter at meetings with members from the South African Police Head Office,
including Captain "Kuifie" Fouche,
Superintendent Jan Meyer, Director Roos and Superintendent Alfons Theron; who also made their
own alterations to it.
50. Thereafter, they gave the altered text to informants such as Jannie Smuts, who in turn then gave it
to people such as Niemoller and Jan Viljoen. In the same manner, it was later given to Mike du Toit
(who was one of the accused later on in the Boeremag-case). Many Mdi-SAPS-members worked on
this and made adjustments to it. No single person would be the author of the eventual version.
51 . A mighty amount of information was thus fabricated by Mdi to make the activities of the right-
wingers as more dangerous. Tollie Vreugdenburg was eventually placed as the chief investigating
officer in the Boeremag case, under supervision of Colonel Louis Bester, but (according to my wife)
not all information was passed on to Vreugdenburg and Bester regarding how, and from where, the
orchestering had come from. I don't know exactly what all they knew, or what they believed to be true.
52. General Mark Hankel often boasted to me that he was able to, and achieved it, to fool the other
intelligence agencies of the State, and that he was the actual brain behind project "WACKO".
53. At the time of my retirement, I told JC Smit that he should also retire. At that stage, I had already,
by instructions from the Mdi, wormed JC Smit very deeply into the orchestrated actions of the right-
wingers, so that he could implement instructions from the Mdi, spread orchestrated information from
the Mdi, give and take the lead, and could manage, that is to say, in accord with instructions from the
Mdi, to influence people, tell them what to say at meetings, to plan or to let plans materialise and to
54. Handlers are trained to manipulate informants to do things as the handler wants them to be done,
as often happens, and as was the technique used in project Wacko.
55. The handlers are also trained to carry out instructions given to them, through informants. This
includes influencing members of the public. Informants don't always know what they are getting
themselves, or are, involved in.
56. Hankel and Roos did not want to get rid of JC Smit when I retired. They wanted me to transfer him
to another handler in Gauteng, but I did not know anyone suitable for this in Gauteng, and put it like
this to them.
57. They then wanted me to transfer him to Colonel Louis Pretorius from Klerksdorp, as he was also
well connected. Initially, JC Smit refused and suggested that I still sub-handled him under Pretorius.
Thus Pretorius would handle me, and I handle JC Smit, on a sub-handler basis. I then agreed to this,
on the agreement that I would be phased out as soon as possible. My inner motivation for the phasing
out was that I wanted to have nothing more to do with the lot of lies and self-enriching orchestrated
58. The style within the Mdi is that during the service of Mdi members with the SAPS, they are
compromised, whereafter they become victims of blackmail, or fear of exposure, and have to do
everything legally or illegally, as is expected from them, even if they leave the SAPS. I, myself, was
continually careful of such compromising, but in the course of my work, have indeed been involved in
uncomfortable aspects while carrying out instructions to me; I also viewed myself as vulnerable,
although not in a self-destructive way. What was worse, though, was the practice of Mdi to incriminate
people and collegues, or earlier collegues falsely ("frame"), with devastating results, so that this,
eventually, became my greatest fear. I could not ignore these risks, and initially (after I retired in 2001)
carried out or met with instructions, as far as possible, from orders given by officers in control of
project "WACKO", with gradual phasing out.
59. All Mdi-SAPS-involved believed that they would get promotions, as their status with the ANC-
Government would climb. There was the belief that this was a chance for great financial benefit as
well as enrichment through new vehicles and equipment from the secret funds for the SAPS.
60. Any investigation would indicate how many vehicles are registered on the private names of SAPS-
Mdi members while these items are, indeed, State property, but are utilized as private property.
Examples exists of, for instance, a motor vehicle, motorbike, minibus, trailor - all State property -
registered on the same name of an individual of the SAPS-Mdi. It is extremely difficult to audit and
control, as everything is handled covertly. An audit of SAPS-Mdi-members' names on the vehicle
registration system throughout the past years would indicate what the present position is, and what it
was, from time to time, during the past years, and if all State property is accounted for, or was
returned to the State. I know it was often not.
61. When the Boeremag-accused Jan Rudolf ("Rudi") Gouws and Herman Van Rooyen were hiding in
the Nylstroom-area, they were discovered by herdsmen, who reported this. The Mdi did not arrest
them, but got the SAPS-Special Forces to carry out surveillance on them for more than a month, and
to not arrest them, so that the Mdi-SAPS-members could first acquire enough vehicles and equipment
for themselves from the sercret fund under the cloak that it was acquired to allow them to blend in
with the general public for the sake of the planned arrests.
Certain important events regarding the Boeremag case
62. The State orchestrated explosives training of the Boeremag accused (All preperations was
planned by Hankel, Pretorius and Miranda Loots).
62.1 According to what he let me know, Colonel Louis Pretorius acquired explosives, which were
specially prepared, from the explosives factory (as he called it) outside Klerksdorp.
62.2 JC Smit was taught by Pretorius, and an unknown person, inside my house in Pretoria on how
explosives work, and how to use it to blow up certain, specific things. I, myself, do not know
explosives and could not join the conversation, but I just listened. JC Smit was also, then, shown how
to mix the components of the explosives together to achieve the final product. According to JC Smit,
explosive-components were given to him at a later date by Louis Pretorius, with the instructions that
he had to train certain men (such as Herman Van Rooyen, who was eventually arrested near
Waverley, and later became an accused in the Boeremag-case) on how to produce explosives, and
how it should be used. At the above mentioned training session, I made my objections against this to
Louis Pretorius, and said that it was illegal. He then assured me that the the explosive components
that he would give to JC Smit, would not be strong enough to do any real damage.
62.3 Later, on another day, JC Smit arrived by me with components for explosives in his car, which,
according to him, he had to take to Warm Baths. He was afraid that he would be caught with the stuff
in his car, and would then get into big trouble. We knew that he had no recourse, as Pretorius then
also confirmed by telephone to me when I phoned and asked him about it. Pretorius, however, made
it clear that it was "for the case" and that the case should be built urgently, meaning that evidence
against the Boeremag should be orchestrated so seriously and fast as possible, in order that even the
"broad" public would turn against the "Boeremag" and the right-wingers.
I confronted my wife about this. She indicated that she and Hankel had everything well under control,
and carried information on it. This incident, once again, convinced me that unfair provocation was
involved, of which I did not want to play a part in.
62.4 My orders from Pretorius was to drive behind Smit with the explosives to Warm Baths, and to
hand it over to him there, which is what happened.
From there, he left, I don't know to where, and I didn't want to know, because all of it was unethical
and wrong. I did, however, wait for Smit until he joined me again late that night, where he handed
back the superfluous explosive-components to me, and we went back to my home in Pretoria. Here
we spoke for a long time, and I explained to him that he is just as guilty as the guys he had just
trained, and that he should extricate himself.
My further involvement and knowledge
63. In this time period I repeatedly told my wife, as well as Colonel Pretorius and General Hankel, that
they are instigating crime and are trying to involve innocent people just for their own benefit. Loots
and Hankel scoffed at it. Pretorius became very moody towards my attitude. He increasingly
demanded that JC Smit should ignore me totally and exclude me from all his activities, seeing as that
I did not want to work/play together with them, which is then what happened eventually. However, for
long afterward, Smit came to discuss many things with me, and asked for advice many times.
64. I still, however, remained well informed through Colonel Miranda Loots (my wife) and by Hankel:
64.1 My wife often discussed the actions and planning of Mdi with me. Occasionally, Hankel also did
this. During these occasions I noticed that, according to my mind, they had tunnel vision, and did not
take my attempts to get them out of this, to heart. They were fixated to "frame" as many ring-wingers
as quickly as possible, and which would lead to arrests, but they were then still apparently scared of
mistakes, which they discussed, as well as the case with me openly, under the guise of getting more
ideas and insight. There should be remembered that I trained, and guided, my wife in the SAPS
myself, and that she viewed me as her mentor.
64.2 They engaged in various such discussions with me, especially by telephone. My wife engaged in
such discussions with me especially after working hours.
64.3 During the process, I repeatedly advised my wife to end the provocation of the so-called
Boeremag, as according to my mind, everything would explode in their faces one day. My wife and I
have been separated from table and bed since 2008, and we are busy with a long and contested
Yet, not-withstanding, she still conducted such discussions with me up to and during 2010.
Hankel (with a lot of help, especially from my wife) arranged and paid the following with regard to the
two escapees in the Boeremag case:
65. My wife kept me fully informed regarding this matter while I assisted her with it. When it was finally
decided that the escapees Rudi Gouws and Herman Van Rooyen should be arrested, an
arrangement was made with a man, who had been a policeman earlier, and was a police agent, to
take the two to an apartment in Centurion as a supposed "safe haven", where they could carry on
hiding. My task (on request from my wife) was to buy groceries for the apartment, and to make it look
as believable as possible when the two would arrive there, together with the agent. Everything was
already in place that they would be arrested the following morning by the Special Forces. Everything
was planned and arranged long before the time ("staged").
Thereafter, the same agent received R450 000 in cash (thus tax free and untraceable). An agent may
not receive additional rewards, but Hankel approved the money, and it was paid in cash to the agent
one week after the arrests, so that no questions could be asked, and no fingers could be pointed. My
wife showed the money to me at our home before it was to be paid over to the agent.
The Waverley arrests
66. With regards to the arrests of the sought after suspects in Waverley, Pretoria, sergeant "Sam"
Theron (the ex-husband of my one sister) indicated that he had known for about a week prior to their
arrest, that the suspects involved used a specific house as their home, and as a place from where
they planned to commit crimes. This planning had, it is believed, been discussed with the informant
Otto Gerner, and was known to Mdi. According to Theron, they were not arrested earlier because of
the concern that Gerner would be compromised, and furthermore, they wanted to catch the suspects
in possession of explosives.
The declarations of witnesses in the Boeremag-case.
67. Colonel Louis Pretorius had invited me, before the arrests in the Boeremag-case, to
Hartbeespoort Dam along with him, a certain Karen, and Colonel "Sollie", to draw up the declarations
of the witnesses, so that they would not contradict each other. I refused the invitation. Furthermore,
JC Smit told me that nearly none of the State witnesses had ever made their own declarations, but
that they were mostly drawn up by Colonel Louis Pretorius, and was altered by him from time to time,
to correspond with other declarations. According to JC Smit, only once all the declarations, with the
co-operation of Luitenant-Colonel Vreugdenburg, corresponded with each other and all the facts and
supposed followed each other chronologically and fitted in with each other, was it presented to
witnesses for their signatures, and whereafter everyone had to learn the declarations verbatim like
parrots. It was therefore not the declarations of witnesses, but of the Mdi-SAPS-members (especially
Pretorius and Vreugdenburg).
68. In 2001 (or possibly 2002 - I can't remember the dates exactly), Colonel Pretorius requested
myself and JC Smit to provide investigative declarations for the SAPS dossier for prosecutions in the
Boeremag-case. I - and I believe also JC Smit - knew that it was unethical and dishonest to make the
requested declarations, to bear witness, or have anything further to do with the Boeremag-case.
Hereafter, I refer to this as the "aforementioned reasons" for the objections I and JC Smit, upon which
we, as discussed hereafter, refused to make declarations, to bear witness or to be further involved
with the Boeremag case.
69. Both I, and JC Smit, initially objected to the submissions of declarations, or the bearing of witness,
in this case due to aforementioned reasons, and wanted to have nothing further to do with the case.
70. However, Colonel Louis Pretorius pressurized JC Smit into laying down the necessary sworn
statement with regards to his (that is, JC Smit's) role in, and with regards to, the Boeremag-saga.
Colonel Pretorius threatened him, and said that, should he not make the required declaration and
appear as State witness, he also would be arrested and charges would be laid against him, along with
the Boeremag suspects.
71 . I was also put under pressure by Louis Pretorius to deliver the declaration required from me, and
to deliver witness thereto, but I remained resolute in my refusal due to the aforementioned reasons.
72. Both I, and JC Smit, informed Colonel Pretorius very clearly of our objections due to the
aforementioned reasons. The pressure on me, and JC Smit, due to our determined refusals, was
raised so high that we felt so threatened thereby, that we decided to attain legal advice.
73. I knew the lawyer Piet Breedt, who was one of my earlier colleagues, and along with JC Smit,
decided that we would approach him for legal advice via Tom Van Rensburg, who then made an
appointment for us. JC Smit and I met with Piet Breedt at his offices in Bosman Street, Pretoria, for a
74. We shared our mentioned refusals due to aforementioned reasons fully with him, and his reaction
was that the matter was so serious of nature, that we should involve advocate Johan Gaum, also an
earlier-collegue, with the consultations and handling of the matter for his (Gaum) knowledge and lead.
This was done, and we met with Gaum, together with Piet Breedt one night (I can not remember the
exact date) at his offices for an official consultation.
75. JC Smit and I informed advocate Gaum and Piet Breedt of the details on how the Boeremag case
was orchestrated by the Mdi of the police, and of the aforementioned reasons for our mentioned
Our mentioned refusals.
76. Advokcate Gaum listened to us and also asked many investigative questions. Eventually he
indicated that I was in a much better position than JC Smit, as he (Smit) was an instigator to the build
up of the Boeremag-case, and his contribution was thus very serious, especially with regard possible
recourse. Advocate Gaum would represent JC Smit in this, while he would assist me should the State
attempt to force me to make the required declaration or to witness thereon.
77. Furthermore, advocate Gaum said that Piet Breedt should start drafting the documents of
application for JC Smit, as it would be problematic to keep JC Smit out of the Boeremag-hearing.
78. Advocate Gaum and Piet Breedt were thus, at that stage, relatively informed with regards to the
aforementioned reasons. Gaum advised us to remain resolute in our mentioned refusal and to
excercise our right of silence.
79. The costs for the first appointment the night with Gaum ran R4 000, which JC Smit paid.
80. After the consultation, I, and JC Smit, discussed with each other the costs of legal representation,
and as neither of us had the financial ability to carry it, neither of us could afford further legal
81 . According to the regular discussions of JC Smit with me, he was so intimidated by Colonel
Pretorius, and was made such promises of rich rewards (should he co-operate by making the required
declaration and deliver witness) whereby he could be bought, that he eventually agreed to make a
declaration and appear as State witness.
82. According to the communications of JC Smit with me, Colonel Pretorius drew up the declaration of
JC Smit in the Hartebeespoort Dam-area by himself, as he (Pretorius) wanted to ensure the case and
information on this matter corresponded with the other declarations, where after he then presented
the declarations, according to Smit, for the last mentioned to sign, and Smit signed it without him
having been involved personally with the formulation thereof, and was not allowed to alter anything on
83. I, myself, refused throughout, to the great upset of Pretorius, to provide any declaration.
84. A relatively long period after the consultation with advocate Gaum, initially first Hankel, and then
my wife, told me that State advocate Paul Fick SC wanted to speak with me regarding my
involvement with the whole build-up to the Boeremag-case, and they actually pestered me, and I was
told to go speak with advocate Fick at his offices.
85. Although I initially refused, the pressure on me was so great that I eventually agreed to speak to
advocate Fick once. I also saw the interview as an opportunity to discuss the true version of events as
I experienced it, and my reasons for refusing to make a declaration or to witness in court, with the
senior State advocate.
86. My wife then took me to the Palace of Justice in Pretoria where Tollie
Vreugdenburg met me at the gate in Vermeulen Street, and took me to the office of advocate Fick SC
which is under in the building.
87. There, I met Fick, whom I had not known previously. Advocate Pieter Luyt
(whom I already knew then, as both of us run for the Acasia Athletics Club) and a female advocate
(who I did not know, and whose name I cant remember, but who was supposed to be one of the
assistant-advocates in the team of the States' prosecutors) was also present there, as well as Colonel
88. The team (with advocate Fick SC who spoke the most) initially tried to convince me to make a
declaration, and witness in the case. They said, repeatedly, that I would step out of the case with
great honour. Eventually, they tried to force me in a threatening manner, to lay down a declaration in
the Boeremag-case. The aggression, and dominating manner, which the team displayed towards me
was unbearable. Adv Fick SC threatened that I could be prosecuted as an accessory in Boeremag-
case if I did not co-operate by laying down a declaration, and by witnessing.
89. However, I continued my refusal throughout on grounds of the aforementioned reasons, which I
stated repeatedly. I explained repeatedly to them that it was unfair, and unethical, to influence people
and to incite them to crime, and then, as soon as orchestrated actions have developed far enough, to
arrest and prosecute such people who are, in fact, innocent.
90. I repreatedly made it very clear that the right-wing people involved were in reality busy with
defensive planning for assistance to the SAPS in the case of unrests, but that the Mdi themselves,
with their agents, turned it into an offensive action, and implicated innocent people, drew them into
prosecutionable crime, and even falsely incriminated ("framed") many, and that I could no longer
accept it and could not take part in it.
91. The continual pressure on me, and their refusal to understand reason, eventually led to a big
fallout between me and the mentioned other people, wherein emotions began running high.
92. The three advocates and Colonel Vreugdenburg had teamed up strongly from the beginning
against me ("ganged up" according to English) and intimidated and threatened me increasingly with
great aggressiveness, while I stood alone throughout. This was one of the most terrifying events in my
93. I continually repeated the aforementioned reasons for my mentioned refusal, and with my resolute
refusal they became more aggressive. In the process, I eventually stated that big politics sat behind
the orchestrating, and that it was the political playball of senior police members, which did not impress
me, and of which I did not want to be any part of, namely that it was the activities and rivalry of
"Brotherbonders" or something like that, and stated clearly that I wanted to extricate myself from the
conversation. (I made the statement while I was upset after I had, shortly before the conversation,
heard from someone that Colonel Louis Pretorius and Director Roos were both members of a secret
organization, and Pretorius is envious because in the secret organization, he is senior to Roos, but in
the SAPS, he is his junior. I thought reference was made to the "Broederbond" and that is why I made
94. The interview was thereby closed with ill feeling, and we parted from each other with ill feelings.
Advocate Fick SC snarled at me during the closing process that,
(a) I would not be welcome once the courtcase begins, and I would not be allowed to attend the court
cases, except if I should decide to co-operate; and
(b) that I may not try to speak to the defense teams under any circumstances, as I was under the oath
of secrecy and I would be prosecuted if I spoke with them.
95. I then withdrew myself from the conversation, left and did not have anything to do with advocate
Fick and his associates again. I saw advocate Luyt again thereafter at running opportunities, but we
did not speak about official matters.
96. In fact, I did not attend the court case initially, although I was against the whole affair throughout.
My wife, however, kept me updated on the case throughout, until we separated.
97. Because of my oath to secrecy, and the threat of prosecution by Adv Fick SC, I did not make
contact with the defense teams initially. I believed there was no medicine to cure the unethical affair,
except to write a book about it one day, not withstanding the oath to secrecy, so that the public could
be informed about the real background. (Later, I was advised by advocate Gaum via Tom Van
Rensburg that I had acted correctly to speak with advocate Fick SC, and to tell him that I did not want
to be a witness in the case.)
98. During 2005, I, and an old friend and earlier collegue, Alphons Theron, who also worked on the
Boeremag-information, had already toyed with the idea to write a book about the Boeremag-case
oneday. But we never did it.
99. In 201 1 , I left the country to work in India, where my concern for the lot of the accused in the
Boeremag-case got the better of me, and I returned to South Africa to try to find further opportunities
to reveal the truth about the matter, amongst other things.
100. Upon my return, I first tried to attend the court case to assess the progress of the case.
1 01 . During my first visit to the court, I landed next to journalist Karin Labuschagne from Radio
Jakaranda in the court, whom I did not know at that stage. Before the commencement of the hearing,
Colonel T Vreugdenburg approached me and asked me what I was looking for there, and said that I
know that I am not allowed there. I refused to leave, and asked him to put it in writing that I may not
be there, or that the Judge would have to tell me to vacate the courtroom.
102. Colonel Vreugdenburg went to speak with advocates Fick SC and Luyt, and the court was
adjourned after a sitting of only about ten minutes. Advocate Luyt then approached me and asked
how I was, and what I was looking for there. I shared with him that I wanted to acquaint myself with
what was going on in the case. He asked that I rather not come again.
103. After the court adjourned, Karin Labuschagne introduced herself to me and asked who and what
I am, and why people did not want me there. I explained to her in short who I am, and then left the
104. About a week later, just before the Comrades-marathon in 201 1 , I enlightened Karin
Labuschagne, during a coffee-appontment of about two hours, to a relatively broad synopsis of my
impression, and my stand on the Boeremag-case, as well as my mentioned refusals and
aforementioned reasons, and about my prospective book and the reasons for it. She was enthusiastic
about such a book, and wanted the rights for it, and the instruction to write it, so that everything could
be revealed. According to her, she had already done her own research thereon.
105. We decided to attend the court case together, and again I was confronted by Colonel
Vreugdenburg, after which a police official, who was not known to me, came to sit right behind me
throughout the rest of the court hearing.
1 06. The court case was postphoned shortly thereafter.
107. After the case was postphoned and the court had adjourned, I approached advocates Louisa
Van der Walt and Harry Prinsloo, and gave them my particulars.
108. I told them that I could give them background information and that everyone everywhere in the
court building and in the cells are eavesdropped on by the police, and invited them to contact me, so
that I could give the relevant information to them in detail.
However, they did not contact me.
109. I and Karin Labuschagne had contact again at times.
1 1 0. Thereafter I was contacted by people who work at Mdi, who told me that my celphone calls were
listened in on by Mdi, and that my sms-messages and my email messages were monitored by Mdi,
and I lay complaints about this, upon which Colonel Werner Smit and Colonel Eugene Pitout from Mdi
visited me on two occasions and questioned me about it. They then also enlightened me that they had
been informed that I want to clear my heart about the Boeremag-saga, and threatened me repeatedly
that I would be charged, and prosecuted, should I say anything or reveal anything about it, or write a
book about it, as I was still bound to the oath of secrecy.
Eavesdropping after the incarcerations of the accused
111. According to my wife, there were serious attempts to acquire a legal court order to eavesdrop on
the accused in their cells, but the judge rejected this outright early in the matter after the arrests had
been made, to the great consternation of the Mdi.
112. According to her, General Hankel then, on his own accord, acted on behalf of the Mdi and
demanded it, and gave orders that it had to be implemented, and gave instruction that the 'right'
person at the Corrective Services should be found to assist the Mdi to get access, so that
eavesdropping apparatus could be installed.
According to my wife, she and Hankel went many times to speak with a certain Mr Zack Modise, and
at times Kenny Bouwer, at the Head Office of the Correctional Services. Through discreet enquiries, I
received confirmation that the last mentioned person was the contact within the Department of
Correctional Services for the irregular entrance to the relevant cells, and that authority, and access,
could be given through him for the irregular installation of the eavesdropping equipment while the
detainees were in the courts, or at times when they could leave their cells.
113. According to my information, a certain Andre Storm at "C" Max prison was also drawn in by Col.
Miranda Loots to get access there.
114. According to my wife, everyone at Mdi wanted to know what was discussed between the
accused and their legal representatives throughout the court proceedings since the beginning, but to
the consternation of Mdi, no permission could be acquired to monitor it in any manner.
1 1 5. According to my wife, General Hankel would not accept this. According to her, he himself went to
America at that time, and I understand he acquired the equipment there.
Just after the case started, very sophisticated and sensitive image and sound equipment for the
monitoring of the whole courtroom and the consultation room was installed.
1 16. I have, in fact, entered the Head office of Mdi on two occations at Prieska Street, Erasmuskloof,
where I was shown the so-called CINOC (Crime Intelligenge
Nodal Operational Centre) which is also called the "War Room", by my wife. Both occasions were
during a one year period of 2008, the first time being before my foot operation, before the Comrades-
marathon. The property was not like it is today. The second occasion was a relatively long time after
my operation, maybe early the following year. I was taken inside by my wife, Colonel Miranda Loots
("Miranda") who wanted to show, or boast to me, how advanced the system is which was designed
under instructions of General Hankel for eavesdropping and monitoring. I cannot remember the exact
dates. I do know, however, that the first time, the centrum was rigged in nicely with a lot of TV
screens/monitors, according to me. On the second occasion, the centrum had been extended with
more screens and was tidier.
1 17. On both occasions it was after working hours and over weekends, when the minimum staff
members were in offices so that I would not draw attention. Miranda said that it would be impossible
during the week, as there would be too many people present, but that General Hankel was aware of
118. In both cases, Miranda activated something on a computer in the CINOC, whereupon she then
showed, step by step, how the Boeremag suspects climb out of a Njala, walk towards us who are
looking at the screen, and then, as they are walking towards us, they turn into a door on the left.
Miranda said this is where you go in to the court cells. Then I saw on the screen how people came in
through a door, and on the next screen, I saw the bars of the cells.
119. The following image recording was of where accused stood in the cells and spoke.
It was of the Boeremag-detainees only. Then she quickly went over various recordings and then
boasted: "Look here the detainees are consulting with their legal advisors". People who I could
recognise on the video recording were, amongst others, advocate Louisa Van der Walt and Harry
Prinsloo, who were consulting separately with the detainees. I did not recognise any of the accused. A
person could see everything clearly the whole time, and the sound was also very clear, so that you
could hear clearly what the legal advisors and the detainees were discussing with each other. In parts
of the recording wherein they were consulting, a person could only see a white wall and a part of the
corner of the room. On the other screen it showed a white wall again, with a part of the bars - the
images were from above, thus part of the side of the roof is recorded.
All this vision material was recorded and not live broadcasts.
120. Miranda then showed again, and said that if the accused "just walk up right here behind this",
they come, according to her, up with the steps to the courtroom. Miranda then showed to the right
hand side of the screen.
There was, according to my mind, no cameras on the steps, because I could never see the steps.
Then Miranda showed image material of inside the actual courtroom. I could only see the part where
the accused sit, and where the legal representatives sit or stand. I could not see the bench or the
gallery, but Miranda told me that the whole court could be seen with other cameras.
121 . My wife said that everywhere the accused go, their movements are covered by cameras and
sound equipment, even outside the courtroom itself. One of the recordings showed a room with a
table and chairs. This room was directly across the courtroom, according to Miranda, with a window
that looks out onto Vermeulen Street. Here, only the image recording was clear. The sound of the
recording was unclear during both occasions. I was, however, during the second last week of May in
201 1 , in the main building myself for the first time, and could recognise such a room, right across the
entrance to the courtroom.
122. The other times in which I saw the images was also in 2008/2009:
During this time, I saw images, at least twice, on Miranda's official Nokia celphone. It was direct
broadcasts, and Miranda had boasted how developed their technology was at Mdi. If Miranda wanted
to see different images, she had to exit the one she was viewing, click in on the image of another
camera, which had to be given the chance to load in a few short seconds, which froze for split-
seconds throughout, and then she had to wait so that it could be activated to view direct image
123. Miranda also boasted on various occasions to me, with regards to the technology which Mdi use.
She boasted about everything, and laughed repeatedly, about the detainees while she showed the
image material on her laptop computer to me at our house, and referred to them as "fokken assholes".
Often the corners in the various rooms shown on the cameras were the same. The reason for this,
according to Miranda, was that Mdi wanted to record everything to thus know what was going on the
whole time. They wanted to monitor everything, but especially everything that was discussed and
planned between the accused and their legal representatives, especially in consultations, because
then they could, amongst other things, know what the defense plan, and what questions would be
asked during the cross examination.
124. Miranda boasted a lot that Mdi was always a step ahead of the defense because they recorded
everything, and thereby saw and heard the planning of the accused and their legal representatives.
125. According to Miranda, everything is monitored when the legal representatives consulted with
their respective clients. Various cameras were connected to audio equipment and according to her,
everything is shown live and with sound in the "CINOC" (or sometimes called the "war room").
Therefore the Mdi-SAPS-members had monitored everything at all times, and knew what was
discussed, said, and planned during the defense. It allowed the Mdi-SAPS-members to be in a
position to plan counter actions or counter witnesses or suitable answers with direct communication
thereof to advocate Paul Fick SC and/ord his team members.
126. On various occasions, Miranda had told her sister Maxine, and my daughter, in my presence,
that Mdi heard the expected questions of the defense on recordings. They then prepared answers
from their computer history quickly for certain questions, but for other questions, they made up
Usually Tollie Vreugdenburg or Louis Bester (she also spoke of "Vice" sometimes) would be phoned
immediately through CINOC, and the message of the expected question from the defense team and
suggested answer would be relayed. It was then carried over to the legal team of the State
immediately, to ensure that they would be prepared, should it be raised in court. Miranda pertinently
said that information was passed directly from Mdi to the legal team of the State.
127. These recordings with images and sound were shown to me, every time by Miranda at my home
in Rietfontein, Pretoria, except for the two times at Erasmuskloof in the "CINOC". The time period in
which I saw it was about between 2008 and 2012 before the World Soccor League Tournament
started. One of the occasions was specifically while I was braaing meat in my braai area. My daughter
and Maxine, who is the sister of my wife, were also present.
The monitoring of detainees at "C Max"
128. Miranda told me that a high ranking officer from DKD (the Department of Correctional Services)
was approached with a false authority by Hankel and herself, to allow for monitoring equipment to be
installed in the prison where the Boeremag-detainees were, and that they kept the people who were
approached "happy" for their and the co-operation of the DKD, this means to say that they were
129. According to Miranda, there was at the "C Max prison", apparently at the entrance, or just scewly
off the top of the entrance, consulting rooms, with one room which was given to the Mdi, where all the
equipment was stored which made the monitoring possible. It was like this since early in 2003/2004,
seeing as Miranda and Hankel and Sam Theron, amongst others, had then already boasted to me
130. It has been since a long time ago already, that Miranda boasted to me that Mdi knows everything
that goes on in the cells, and what the detainees do. There was, according to her, often laughed and
joked about the private and personal matters of the men, such as when they change their clothes, and
131. Miranda often bragged to me that Mdi did not have the necessary authority for the monitoring,
and that it was done "hot", and that no one else knew that this would be taking place.
With regards to the eavesdropping on detainees and their families
132. EVERYONE in the Boeremag-case is, according to Miranda, being eavesdropped on, which also
includes their close friends and family. From the landlines at homes, celphones, conversations, sms's,
emails, up to their movements - everything is monitored. Some of the eavesdropping is legal, with
authority, but a lot of it is also illegal, and without authority.
133. So there are two occasions where Nelmari, the ex-wife of accused Herman Van Rooyen, was on
holiday for a week at La Cote d'Azur, at Margate, where she was followed by Mdi members and
where people from CTC (Counter Terrorism Centre, also part of Mdi) had gathered. I was with
Miranda in Margate, during the October-school holiday, and had even, on one occasion, sat down on
the beach next to Nelmari, and started up a little conversation. After this, I was heavily castigated by
Miranda and Sam Theron about this. They conveyed the message to me that Director Roos was very
upset about this.
134. Most of the eavesdropping is still, and does take place without authority, according to Miranda.
DEPONENT: DEON LOOTS
SIGNED and SWORN to at Pretoria on this day of January 201 3
by the Deponent who declares that -
■ he understands the contents of this declaration and that it is true and correct;
■ he has no objections against taking the prescribed oath; and
■ he accepts the prescribed oath as binding on his conscience;
with compliance to the stipulations of the Regulations as provided in
Government Notices R1 258, R1 648 en R1 428.
Notes from the translator: Director Roos - Roos is a surname on the list of the illuminati;
Verligte Aksie Groep - Verligte Aksie was funded by Oppenheimer. All NP cabinet ministers before
power was handed over to the ANC were members of the VAG
27. I must mention that all large right-wing activities, be they Safety (SAPS), National intelligence
Agency ("NIA"), Military Intelligence, and presently now also the South African Secret Services are
infiltrated, and are often taken over, managed and directed covertly. - this is very possible as in
reference to attachment 10, all intelligence services was channed by Pik Botha to run to his office and
that of President Botha directly before it went out to the relevant departments. Pik Botha worked
directly for the Crown.